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Law Beyond the State: A Reply 
to Liam Murphy
Samantha Besson* 
Voluntarism about the very sources of  international law is incoherent, but there is a better way 
to interpret this view. The sources of  international law being what they are, legal obligations 
are never imposed on states without their consent. ... The claim ... is false (though perhaps it 
once was true), but it is perfectly coherent, and it is not absurd to wish that it were (still) true.
Liam Murphy, ‘Law Beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions’1
1 State Consent, Legal Positivism and the Duty to Obey 
International Law
Liam Murphy was among the first analytical legal philosophers to venture into discus-
sions of  the philosophy of  international law.2 His contribution to the field is also one 
of  the most illuminating.3 His new piece ‘Law beyond the State: Some Philosophical 
Questions’ is a welcome consolidation and an update of  his views on the subject. One 
of  Murphy’s most interesting arguments in this piece, besides his superb reconstruc-
tion of  H.L.A. Hart’s views about the existence of  an international legal system and 
the best way to understand them in relation to Hans Kelsen’s (section 2), is his discus-
sion of  the role of  state consent in international law-making. It is also the one I would 
like to take issue with in this short reply by linking it to his considerations on legal 
positivism (section 1) and the ‘duty to obey global law’ (section 5).
Murphy is right to argue in the first section of  his article that legal positivism is best 
kept separate from voluntarism in international law. The latter’s identification with 
legal positivism is largely accidental and, at best, accounted for on historical and politi-
cal grounds.4 Even if  it is descriptively correct to consider that state consent plays an 
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1 Murphy, ‘Law Beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions’, in this issue, 203, at 205.
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important role in the positing of  international law, this does not make the grounds of  
international law a matter of  will. Considering consent as a criterion for the validity 
of  international law would be question begging; no state has consented to the prin-
ciple of  law according to which treaties (that states have consented to) are a source of  
law – that is, pacta sunt servanda.5 In short, as Murphy puts it, ‘voluntarism about the 
very sources of  international law is incoherent’, but this should not be a concern for 
international legal positivism because voluntarism is not ‘implied by the idea that the 
grounds of  law are matters of  fact’.6
While I  agree with Murphy that state consent cannot account for the validity of  
international law, I would like to argue, as I have elsewhere, that state consent plays an 
important normative role in international law-making.7 After all, international legal 
obligations are never imposed on states without their consent, and this requires a justifi-
cation. Of  course, unlike many authors who have argued against the conceptual connec-
tion between state consent and validity in international law, and then consider consent 
as an unhappy resilient feature of  the international law practice that one should be 
pragmatic and resigned about, Murphy does take seriously the role of  states’ consent in 
accounting for their obligations under international law. According to him, ‘the fact that 
most states have in fact consented to most of  international law is ... very important’.8 He 
even concedes that linking international legal obligations to state consent is a ‘perfectly 
coherent’ claim and perhaps one that was once ‘true’.9 Nevertheless, Murphy adds that 
today the claim that ‘legal obligations are never imposed on states without their consent’ 
is ‘false’.10 He discusses this claim in the fifth section of  the article. However, the author 
addresses what he calls ‘the argument from consent’ only as a ground for the duty to obey 
international law. This is regrettable because there are many other ways to argue for the 
normative role of  state consent than to make the long discredited argument that consent 
provides a justification for the authority of  international law.11
In short, while I  agree with Murphy that consent is neither a criterion for the 
validity of  international law nor a ground for its legitimacy, one needs to consider 
alternative justifications for the role of  state consent with respect to the legitimacy 
of  international law. Murphy’s argument against consent as a ground for the legiti-
mate authority of  international law is both descriptive or ‘factual’ and normative.12 
As I  will explain, however, the proposed descriptive rebuttal fails to convince, and 
the normative critique is incomplete. It should be complemented, I will propose, by a 




7 See Besson, ‘State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making: Dissolving the Paradox’, 29 
Leiden Journal of  International Law (2016) 289, at 298–299, 303–304.
8 Murphy, supra note 1, at 230.
9 Ibid., at 205.
10 Ibid.
11 See Besson, supra note 7, at 300–302.
12 Murphy, supra note 1, at 230.
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2 Debunking the Descriptive Case against State Consent
Murphy is very cautious about the descriptive part of  his argument against state con-
sent in international law-making. He concedes that the ‘factual basis of  the consent 
argument has never been its gravest weakness’.13 He adds that the case for it is ‘not 
laughable’ and, later on, that ‘most states have in fact consented to most of  interna-
tional law’.14 All the same, he claims, ‘the case for the actual fact of  consent’ has not 
been made out. Of  course, Murphy is not alone in making this claim. It has become 
common for international lawyers to observe or predict the erosion of  state consent 
in international law-making.15 Importantly, however, the changes usually identified 
are mostly located at the periphery of  international law16 – indeed, the examples most 
mentioned are the rise of  soft law and the prevailing role of  unilateral decisions by 
powerful states.17 Although there are clearly new non-consensual means of  interna-
tional cooperation, none of  them is (yet) regarded as a source of  international law 
stricto sensu. More importantly, the latter remains mostly consent based. This is the 
case with the most important sources of  international law – that is, treaties and cus-
tomary international law. Thus, if  there is a threat to the role of  state consent in inter-
national law-making it is external, rather than internal, to international law.
Murphy puts forward three elements to ‘undermine the claim that international law 
imposes no obligation without consent’: the existence of  jus cogens norms that states 
should not derogate from even if  they disagree; the fact that custom binds every new state 
qua state and independently of  its consent; and, finally, the legislative role of  international 
organizations whose law binds states even against their consent.18 Additionally, the author 
indicates that he does not find the ‘doctrine’ of  persistent objection ‘terribly secure’ and, 
accordingly, a convincing argument for the role of  state consent in customary interna-
tional law-making, although he does not say why and seems to endorse it all the same.19
Starting with the last argument and going up the list, it is not surprising that custom-
ary international law may seem, prima facie, to bind some states without, or even against, 
their consent; its formation depends on a general practice only, but its authority extends 
to all states. Importantly, however, this authority only extends to a state provided it has 
not objected, expressly and persistently, to the emerging consensus. Each state may there-
fore dissent and, in so doing, withdraw the consent it was otherwise giving tacitly.20 As 
a result, customary international law-making combines tacit consent in the converging 
practice of  states and explicit dissent in their possibility to object to that practice through 
a persistent objection. To this extent, like international treaties, customary international 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 See, e.g., Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against Their Will’, 241 Collected Courses 
of  the Hague Academy of  International Law (1993) 195.
16 See, e.g., Krisch, ‘The Decay of  Consent: International Law in the Age of  Global Public Goods’, 108 
American Journal of  International Law (AJIL) (2014) 1, at 2, 26ff, 34.
17 See, e.g., J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), Informal International Law-Making (2012).
18 Murphy, supra note 1, at 230.
19 Ibid.
20 See also Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’, 77 AJIL (1983) 413, at 433–434.
236 EJIL 28 (2017), 233–240
law cannot impose obligations on states without their consent.21 This rejoinder should 
also placate Murphy’s second point about every new state being bound by customary 
international law. This claim is false because each state may oppose its persistent objec-
tion. The self-determination of  newly created states was actually one of  the justifications 
for the introduction of  the possibility to waive a persistent objection in the 1960s.
In reply to Murphy’s third critique – that is, the legislative role of  international 
 organizations – one should stress that the authority of  their internal law still relies 
indirectly on their constitutive treaties and, hence, on state consent or, at least, on 
states’ subsequent converging practice.22 The same may be said about the develop-
ment of  international adjudication. This leaves us with Murphy’s first objection – that 
is, the emergence of  jus cogens norms. What characterizes jus cogens norms, however, 
is their normative stringency but not their sources. Of  course, the latter have to be 
such that their stringency can be absolute. However, practice shows that jus cogens 
norms arise, when they do, from treaties as much as from customary international 
law. This is also what Article 53 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties 
indicates when it states that a jus cogens norm is a norm ‘accepted and recognized by 
the international community of  states’ as such.23 As a result, a jus cogens norm cannot 
arise without the consent of  the states it binds.
As I will explain in the next section, however, the justification of  the opposability of  
state consent to the legitimate authority of  international law is democratic, and this, in 
turn, gives it inherent democratic limits. In practice, these limits usually take the shape 
of  non-discrimination rights, on the one hand, and of  absolute or minimal human 
rights duties or other jus cogens norms, on the other. This accounts for why valid reser-
vations, for instance, cannot be made to absolute duties in human rights treaties,24 for 
how international succession law excludes applying the tabula rasa principle to human 
rights treaties, or for how third-party obligations arise from human rights treaties. In 
order to fully grasp the inherent limits to state consent, it is important to start by mak-
ing the normative case for its role in the justification of  obligations under international 
law. It is that very normative prong of  the argument for state consent that is regarded 
as the weakest by Murphy, and the time has come to turn to a discussion of  his critique.
3 Nuancing the Normative Case against State Consent
Prima facie at least, Murphy’s normative argument against state consent is very 
strong. He rightly explains why consent cannot be a ground for the duty to obey inter-
national law. To do so, Murphy relies on the classical argument developed in political 
theory against consent as a ground of  political and legal authority, although he does 
21 See also International Law Commission, Third Report on Identification of  Customary Law, by Michael 
Wood, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682, 27 March 2015, at 61–69.
22 See also Klabbers, ‘Law-Making and Constitutionalism’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of  International Law (2009) 81, at 100, 114.
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
24 See, e.g., Klabbers, ‘The Validity and Invalidity of  Treaties’, in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties 
(2012) 551, at 570–574.
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not make this argument himself  besides a mention in passing.25 As Joseph Raz pointed 
out early on, while consent may account for why promises are morally binding, it does 
not justify why the law binds and, more specifically, give us moral reasons for action. 
Indeed, one may consent to do wrong, while one cannot have a moral reason to do so.26 
As a result, consent cannot be a primary ground for the law’s authority unless the law 
respects autonomy and satisfies an independent test of  legitimacy. Importantly, it is 
not only the plausibility of  actual or express consent to the law that is at stake in this 
rebuttal, since, as Murphy emphasizes, it would actually be plausible in international 
law in contrast to domestic law, but also the conceptual-normative inability, even qua 
hypothetical or tacit consent, to justify the law’s authority.27
Murphy mentions the distinction between treaties and soft law agreements to illustrate 
this point.28 While the former bind as law, the latter (which are not (yet) law) still bind 
as promises, thereby confirming that the duty to obey the law cannot be consent based. 
This is an interesting example to the extent that, as I explained before, soft law is often 
mentioned as evidence of  the lack of  relevance of  state consent in international relations, 
whereas its development should lead to the exact reverse conclusion – soft law is pre-
dominantly based on (gentlemen’s) agreements between states and actually binds states 
because they have consented to it. Of  course, as Raz recognizes, consent may constitute 
an additional reason to respect the law or have trust in it. Consent may contribute to 
enhance the de facto authority of  international law by strengthening respect for it in prac-
tice.29 This is also something Murphy emphasizes when he refers to Allen Buchanan’s 
argument regarding the subjective legitimacy of  international law and accountability.30
Once consent is severed from the potential grounds of  legitimacy of  international 
law, the next question, of  course, is what those grounds actually are. This question is 
not fully settled by Murphy and needs not be settled fully here either.31 In short, I have 
argued elsewhere for a revised Razian conception of  legitimate authority whereby 
international law binds to the extent that the (content-independent and exclusion-
ary) reasons it provides enable its subjects (states and individuals in those states) to 
comply better with the reasons that apply independently to them (service concep-
tion). The grounds for the authority of  international law may range from volitional, 
expressive and epistemic to coordinative reasons. In the revised account I have pro-
posed, however, the main basis for the demand for legitimate authority is reasonable 
disagreement about how to structure common action when such action is required 
morally. Accordingly, the justification of  legitimate authority lies mostly in the coor-
dinating ability of  international law in circumstances of  reasonable disagreement.32  
25 Murphy, supra note 1, at 230, n. 102. In international law, see Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of  International 
Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of  International Law (2010) 79.
26 See J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (1995), at 80–94, 355–369.
27 Murphy, supra note 1, at 229–230.
28 Ibid., at 230.
29 See Raz, supra note 26, at 368–369. See also Besson, ‘The Authority of  International Law: Lifting the 
State Veil’, 31 Sydney Law Review (2009) 343, at 352, 371–372.
30 Murphy, supra note 1, at 230–231. A.  Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (2007).
31 Murphy, supra note 1, at 231.
32 See Besson, supra note 29, at 351ff.
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Moreover, and for the same disagreement-related reasons, this account accommo-
dates the importance of  public and egalitarian, and especially democratic, authority 
by recognizing coordination as a ground for general, and not just piecemeal, authority.
Against this background, it becomes clear how state consent can contribute to rein-
forcing the salience of  the coordinating option – for instance, in international treaty 
making.33 It amounts to a public method for the creation of  content-independent rea-
sons to obey international law in the absence of  a centralized lawmaker.34 This is par-
ticularly important in the circumstances of  substantive and epistemic disagreement 
that prevail in international law.35
The coordination dimension and generality of  the duty to obey international law are 
also emphasized by Murphy.36 Unlike him, however, I think it is a feature that accounts 
of  the authority of  international law can share with domestic ones. Indeed, it is not 
clear why the weakness of  the international enforcement mechanism should ground 
an instrumental duty of  obedience for states that is more general than individual ones 
domestically.37 International law is primarily interpreted and enforced domestically, 
and, to this extent, its enforcement mechanisms are not really weaker than domestic 
ones. Moreover, individuals are the duty bearers of  international law as much as of  
domestic law, and these two sets of  legal duties are not easy to disentangle. Finally, 
the fact that the domestic duty to obey is political (or, at least, more political than the 
international one) does not make any difference in terms of  generality, at least from 
a democratic perspective.38 On the contrary, its publicity and egalitarian dimensions 
require its generality.
4 Complementing the Normative Case for State Consent
While I agree with Murphy that state consent does not provide a ground for the duty 
to obey international law, I think its role goes beyond enhancing general respect and 
compliance with international law. The central role of  state consent in  contemporary 
international law-making is justified democratically, as I have argued elsewhere, and 
even more so in the circumstances of  international reasonable disagreement.39 At first, 
an argument for ‘democratic state consent’ may sound paradoxical. Indeed, domes-
tically, the role of  consent has long been disparaged from a democratic perspective 
 precisely because of  reasonable disagreement. Actually, the equality-based justification 
of  democracy accounts for majority voting instead of  unanimity, thus making consent 
even less relevant procedurally in a democracy.
33 See also ibid., at 353, 371–372.
34 See Christiano, ‘Climate Change and State Consent’, in J. Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice (2015) 17.
35 See Pellet, ‘The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making’, 12 Australian 
Yearbook of  International Law (1988–1989) 22, at 45.
36 Murphy, supra note 1, at 231.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 See Besson, supra note 7, at 305–312.
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Importantly, however, democratic considerations in international law should not be 
conflated with domestic ones.40 First of  all, states should not be treated as equal indi-
vidual members of  an international democratic polity in the same way as individuals 
are equal members of  a domestic democracy. There is no democracy of  states, but 
there should not be one either. States cannot, and should not, be too readily identified 
with individual subjects whose basic equality actually justifies democracy; the same 
justification could not arise from the equality of  states. Second, the conditions of  a 
global democracy for individuals in which states would merely act as their officials 
are not given either. Indeed, in the absence of  the egalitarian pre-conditions for global 
democracy, and, in particular, of  equal and interdependent stakes shared by all of  us 
internationally, there cannot (yet) be a global democracy.41 As a result, the legitimacy 
of  international law cannot, and should not, strictly speaking, be democratic.
All the same, the importance of  democratic legitimacy domestically implies that we 
should try to find a way to respect domestic democracy in the way we make interna-
tional law and, especially, in the political equality of  the members of  democratic states. 
After all, to quote Thomas Christiano, states remain ‘the most important institutional 
mechanism for making large scale political entities directly accountable to people’ 
and, as a result, the sole forum of  democracy.42 It should be clear, therefore, that the 
way to link international law-making processes to domestic democratic  legitimacy is 
to respect the equality of  each democratic state qua statespeople.43
The way to protect the equality of  states (people) qua collective equality is to con-
sider their consent as a requirement in international law-making. The requirement 
of  the equal consent of  states enables small and weak states to resist the domination 
and the hegemony of  large and powerful states or the coalition of  states.44 In turn, 
states’ equal consent protects the individual members of  those states’ right to an equal 
voice in the collective decision-making process they are participating in through their 
states.45 Importantly, considering democratic state consent as a requirement of  inter-
national law-making does not mean considering it as a ground for its legitimacy. As we 
saw before, it simply cannot be such a ground, whether tout court or in a democratic 
context. As a matter of  fact, the legitimacy of  international law is not democratic, 
strictly speaking.46 Its legitimacy is justified on the grounds of  coordination in circum-
stances of  reasonable disagreement. All the same, it is precisely because reasonable 
disagreement among states is widespread and persistent in international law, on the 
one hand, and because of  the centrality of  democratic states in making international 
power accountable to their people, on the other hand, that democratic state consent 
should work as an exception to the prima facie legitimate authority of  international 
40 See Besson, supra note 29, at 368–370.
41 See also Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas 
(eds), The Philosophy of  International Law (2010) 119.
42 Christiano, supra note 34.
43 See Christiano, supra note 41.
44 See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 22, at 114.
45 See Christiano, supra note 34.
46 See Besson, supra note 29, at 349–350.
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law. In these conditions, the way in which democratic state consent ties in is merely as 
an exception to the legitimate authority of  international law that is justified on other 
grounds.
While democratic state consent is an important dimension of  the legitimacy of  
international law, there are inherent limits to it. The first set of  limits pertains to its 
democratic justification and the protection of  the democratic statespeople. Those lim-
its amount to the protection of  the basic conditions of  democracy – that is, minimal 
political equality and absolute human rights duties. A second set of  limits inherent 
to democratic state consent have to do with consent itself. There are at least three of  
them: the free and unconstrained nature of  state consent; its fairness and egalitarian 
features; and its informed and unbiased nature.47 Even within those constraints, there 
are at least four critiques one may make to democratic state consent from a demo-
cratic theory perspective.48 First of  all, state consent does not pay enough attention 
to individual equality and to states’ proportional demography. Second, it is largely 
veto-centred and does not encourage sufficient deliberation among democratic states. 
Third, the international actions of  states’ representatives are not necessarily submit-
ted to internal democratic control. Finally, state consent only protects democratic self-
determination when the state is democratic.
The first three critiques may be addressed through various internal and interna-
tional reforms. This should be done, first of  all, through enhancing proportional rep-
resentation and decision making in international fora such as international courts 
and legislative assemblies; second, through developing transnational comparison 
and deliberation in international legal interpretation and determination; and, third, 
through submitting the internal approval not only of  international treaties but also of  
international negotiation mandates of  the government to parliamentary procedures 
that equate internal legislative ones. The fourth critique is the hardest to address, how-
ever. Indeed, either the state consent exception only benefits democratic states, at the 
expense of  equality with individuals in non-democratic states, or, if  it is generalized to 
all states, it enables the agenda of  non-democratic states to dominate democratic ones, 
again at the expense of  individual equality albeit within democratic states. The least 
objectionable answer therefore is to restrict the right to invoke or oppose one’s state 
consent to democratic states only.49 This is the price of  the minimal legitimacy stan-
dards that arise from state practice in international law and bind states legitimately 
even without their consent.50
47 See Christiano, supra note 34.
48 See Martí, ‘Sources and the Legitimacy of  International Law’, in S.  Besson and J.  d’Aspremont (eds), 
Oxford Handbook on the Sources of  International Law (forthcoming 2017).
49 See also Christiano, supra note 34.
50 See also Buchanan, ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of  International Legitimacy’, 10 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics (2011) 5, at 15–16; Martí, supra note 48.
